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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAwS-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE IN A

SURVIVAL ACTION.-

Plaintiff's infant son was injured and died in Michigan on February 3, 1944 as a
result of the taking fire of a cowboy play suit worn by him which had been allegedly
manufactured by the defendants, New York corporations, and sold to a Michigan
retailer. Having been appointed administrator of the decedent child's estate by a
Michigan court in August, 1948, plaintiff brought this action on January 26, 1949
and alleged that the material used in the suit was highly inflammable, and that the
defendants knew of its inherently dangerous quality. The District Court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground
that it was outlawed by the two year statute of limitations as set forth in Section 130
of the Decedent Estate Law. Plaintiff appealed on the ground that the Michigan
Statutes allowing this action to be brought within six years of the decedent's death
were controlling, and that Section 130 of the Decedent Estate Law had no application where the injury causing the death occurred outside of the State of New York.
On appeal, held, judgment reversed on the grounds that Section 130 of the Decedent
Estate Law did not apply and that the action was permitted by Section 48 (2) of
the New York Civil Practice Act, the appropriate New York statute, and by the
Michigan Statutes pleaded by the plaintiff; but the court expressly declined from
deciding whether the lex loci delicti or the lex Jori should be applied in this case.
Janes v. Sackman Bros. Co. et al., 177 F. 2d 928 (2d Cir. 1949).
It is clearly settled that the law of the place of the wrong determines whether an
action for personal injury survives the death of the injured person.' It was essential
then that the plaintiff in the principal case establish his right of action under the
Michigan death statutes. Because of this requirement it might be argued that the
Michigan statutes of limitations on death and survival actions also should be controlling, but the principles of conflicts of law do not permit such a simple solution.
Generally, a limitation upon the time within which a particular action may be
brought is treated as a limitation upon the remedy, and the law of the forum is
held to be determinative of the plaintiff's rights regardless of where the cause of
action arose. 2 But, if by the lex loci delicti a statute of limitations extinguishes the
right of action, it is extinguished everywhere. 3 Thus, on the basis of the language
of the various statutes of limitations, they have been divided into two classes; those
which generally bar the bringing of an action after the expiration of the statutory
period and are considered remedial; 4 and those which extinguish the right of action
1. State of Maryland v. Eastern Air Lines, 81 F. Supp. 345 (D. D. C. 1948); Kruutarl
v. Hageny, 75 F. Supp. 610 (W. D. Mich. 1948); Baldwin v. Powell, 294 N. Y. 130,
61 N. E. 2d 412 (1945); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 391 (1934).
2.

GOODRICH, CONFLICT or LAWs 240 (3d ed. 1949).

3. The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 (1886); Moore v. Atlantic Coast Lines R.R., 153 F.
2d 782 (2d Cir. 1946).
4. Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How. 406 (U. S. 1850); McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 311
(U. S. 1839); Obear v. First Nat. Bank, 97 Ga. 587, 25 S. E. 335 (1895); Connecticut
Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R.R., 78 N. H. 553, 103 At. 263 (1918).
In Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451 (1886), the Supreme Court stated that the fact that the
limitation is not in the same chapter or section, which creates the liability, does not prevent
it from being substantive, and that it would still be substantive even though, ". . . the
limitation was in a different statute, provided it was directed to the newly created liability
so specifically as to warrant saying that it qualified the right." Id. at 454.
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everywhere or are so related to the right itself that they are treated as substantive 5
If the statute of the place of the wrong is related only to the remedy, it will not
be applied in the forum.6 If the statute of the place of the wrong is treated as substantive, usually it will be applied in the forum. But if it allows a longer period
in which the action may be brought than is allowed by the lax for for the same
cause of action, the jurisdictions differ as to which law should apply.7
In Rosenzweig v. Hellers an action for wrongful death was brought in Pennsylvania
fourteen months after the plaintiff's husband had been killed in New Jersey due to
the negligence of the defendant, a Pennsylvania resident. The Pennsylvania statute
of limitations on actions for wrongful death was one year, and the limitation on
such actions under New Jersey law was two years. The court held that the Pennsylvania statute was controlling. The court adopted the lex fori on the theory that
statutes of limitations should apply with uniformity to all litigants suing in a
particular forum. The court held that it would be inequitable to enlarge the remedy
for causes of action arising outside of the state and to impose the stricter limitation
of the state's own statutes for causes of action arising within the state.0 In a similar
case the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit supported its
application of the lex ori by saying that ". . . while the courts -will enforce a
limitation established under the law of another state, when applicable, it does not
do so to the exclusion of the law of the forum."' 0 In these cases the courts appear
to be treating their own public policy as a supervening element which will not accede
to the substantive law of a foreign state when the law of the foreign state operates
to the detriment of local residents.
On the other hand, in the frequently cited case of Ncgaubauer v. Great Northern
Ry.11 a Minnesota court applied the lkx loci delicti and allowed recovery even
though the limitation under the lax fori had already expired. The court based its
decision on the ground that the statute giving the right of action and the statute
limiting it were parts of the same act, and were intended to be construed together.
The court treated the limitation as a part of the right granted even though the
right and the limitation were placed in different sections of the act of the legislature.J In Therouz v. Northern Pac. R.R.13 the same issue arose as in the

5. Pope v. McCrady Rodgers Co., 164 F. 2d 591 (3d Cir. 1947); Colell v. Delaware,
L. & W. R.R., 80 App. Div. 342, 80 N. Y. Supp. 675 (2d Dep't 1903); Dailey v. New York,
0.

& W. Ry., 26 Misc. 539, 57 N. Y. Supp. 485 (Sup. CL 1899); RETATEM-;T, Cov-

rr--cT
or LAWS § 397 (1934); RESTATEmExT, Co.,ruicr or LAwvs, N. Y. Am.oT. § 605
(1935).

6. See note 4 supra.
7. E.g., Platt v. Wilmot, 193 U. S. 602 (1904); Hutchings v. Lamson, 96 Fed. 720
(7th Cir. 1899) ; Rosenzweig v. Heller, 302 Pa. 279, 153 At!. 346 (1931). Contra: Brunswick Terminal Co. v. National Bank, 99 Fed. 635 (4th Cir. 1900); Theroux v. Northern
Pac. R.R., 64 Fed. 84 (8th Cir. 1894); Negaubauer v. Great Northern Ry., 92 Mnn. 184,
99 N. W. 620 (1904).
8.

302 Pa. 279, 153 AUt. 346 (1931).

9. Id. at 281, 153 Atl. at 348.
10. Hutchings v. Lamson, 96 Fed. 720, 721 (7th Cir. 1899).
11.

92 Minn. 184, 99 N. W. 620 (1904).

12.
13.

Id. at 185, 99 N. W. at 621.
64 Fed. 84 (8th Cir. 1894).
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Negaubauer case and the court held that the Minnesota statute 14(the lex ori) could
only apply to causes of action which originated in Minnesota.
In the principal case the court expressed a similar reason for refusing to apply
the two year limitation period set forth in Section 130 of the New York Decedent
Estate Law. 1 5 That ruling is based upon reliable case authority.'( Hence it will be
noted that New York is not among those states which as a matter of public policy
will refuse to allow a longer period in which to bring the action than is allowed by the
lex fori (i.e., the law of New York) for the same cause of action. But this deference
to the lex loci delicti is not without certain reservations; for Section 13 of the Civil
Practice Act provides: "Where a cause of action arises outside of this state [in favor
of a non-resident] an action cannot be brought in a court of this state to enforce
such cause of action after the expiration of the time limited by the laws either of
this state or of the state or country where the cause of action arose, for bringing
an action upon the cause of action ....,"17 Thus the courts of New York will not
entertain an action after the time set forth in the state's own general statute of
limitations has expired, and furthermore, if the law of the state where the cause
of action arose provides for a shorter period than the general statute of limitations of
New York, then the foreign law will be applied. This construction of Section 13
of the Civil Practice Act is accurately illustrated by the case of McConnell v.
Caribbean Petroleum Co.18 In that case suit for personal injuries was brought
under the Employers Liability Act of Venezuela, and the law of Venezuela (where
the cause of action arose) provided that such actions may be brought within twenty
years of the date of the injury. The New York Court of Appeals held that the suit
was dependent upon a statutory liability, and applied the six year limitation set
forth in Section 48 (2) of the Civil Practice Act rather than the longer period allowed
by the lex loci delicti because of the obvious restrictions imposed by Section 13.
In view of the provisions of Section 13 the problem which confronted the court
in the principal case was whether the statutes of Michigan required the action to be
brought within a shorter time than is allowed by Section 48 (2). Section 48 (2) allows
a period of six years in which an action to recover upon a liability created by
statute may be brought, except as otherwise provided by law. The limitation statutes
of Michigan which are applicable to wrongful death and survival actions are set
forth in two sections of Chapter 9 of the Compiled Laws of Michigan, 1948.
Section 609.13 (2) provides that actions to recover damages for personal injuries
shall be brought within three years of the date of accrual; Section 609.18 provides
that if the person entitled to bring the action for personal injury should die before
the expiration of the three year period, the action may be commenced by the
administrator of the deceased person at any time within two years after the granting
of letters of administration, but that in no event shall the administrator be allowed
to bring the action more than three years after the expiration of the three year
period allowed to the injured party by Section 609.13 (2). Since the party injured
in the principal case died before the expiration of the three year period set forth in
14. Id. at 87.
15. 177 F. 2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1949).
16. Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F. 2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Baldwin v. Powell,
294 N. Y. 130, 61 N. E. 2d 412 (1945); Sharrow v. Inland Lines, Ltd., 214 N. Y. 101,
108 N. E. 217 (1915).
17.
18.

N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 13.
278 N. Y. 189, 15 N. E. 2d 573 (1938).
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Section 609.13 (2), the administrator received the benefit of the extension provided
for by Section 609.18, and the fact that the administrator was appointed four and
a half years after the cause of action arose would not affect his right. Under the
maximum six year period provided for in Section 609.18, the plaintiff had one year
and six months within which to bring this action after the date of his appointment.
Plaintiff brought this action six months after his appointment, and therefore had
complied with all the requirements of the lex loci delicti, and the question of
whether the law of New York or the law of Michigan should control became academic
for this court. But, in a proper case, it is submitted that the Michigan statutes
should be found to be exclusively applicable because in a proper case those statutes
could confine the bringing of suit to a period less than the six year period alloved
by Section 48 (2) of the Civil Practice Act. For example, if the administrator had
been appointed in the same year that the child died, he would thereby be barred
from bringing the action after the expiration of two years from the date of his
appointment. In such a case Section 13 would come into operation and the New
York court would be bound to apply the law of Michigan.
In addition to the question discussed above was the decision of the court that
the plaintiff did not have to obtain ancillary letters because the Michigan statute
gave him a standing in court by making him a trustee of the amount due for the
wrongful death.'2 It would not appear that this is a correct interpretation of the
Michigan Statute, for the recovery was not for wrongful death but for pain and
suffering prior to death. Thus, since the decedent was the one damaged and not the
relatives named in the statute, the compensation would inure to the benefit of the
decedent's estate. Substantiating this view is the fact that the statute specifies that
distribution should be made according to intestacy laws.20
However, it is submitted that the result reached on this point was correct, since
the infant was never in New York and since there were no domestic creditors.2

CONTRACTS-REAL ESTATE BnoxER's COMISSlONS-MEETInG oF Mn DS oN ESSENTIAL TERMS-PURCHASER, READY, WILLING AND ABLE.-Plaintiff was allegedly engaged

as a real estate broker to secure a purchaser for defendant's property at $150,000,
all cash with no other terms stated. It was contended that defendant agreed to pay
the plaintiff broker a five percent commission. Plaintiff advised the defendant that
he had a purchaser ready, willing and able to pay $150,000 for the realty, but
defendant refused to enter into negotiations with the purchaser. Evidence brought
forth at the trial showed that the purchaser procured by the plaintiff had never
possessed $150,000 in cash, although he had dealt in various real estate transactions
involving larger sums and had the backing of a third party of unlimited means,
who knew of the proposed purchase from the defendant, but with whom the pur-

chaser had no binding agreement. Plaintiff instituted suit on the theory of com19. Janes v. Sackman Bros. Co. et al., 177 F. 2d 928, 933 (2d Cir. 1949).
20. Money recovered for pain and suffering of the deceased "shall be distributed according to the intestate laws." 4 Mici. Comx. L.aws § 691.582 (194S).
21. In Wiener v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 298 N. Y. 346, 83 N. E. 2d 673 (1949)
the court stated that, "the rule barring foreign administrators from our courts is just and
reasonable only if applied in cases, first, where there are domestic creditors, and, second,
where the foreign administrator sues to recover a fund in which such creditors may

share." Id. at 351, 83 N. E. 2d 677.
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pleted performance for the amount of the agreed commissions. On appeal from a
verdict in favor of plaintiff, held, two justices dissenting, judgment affirmed. Mengel
v. Lawrence, 276 App. Div. 180, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 443 (1st Dep't 1949).
A broker's contract to sell realty is either an exclusive sales contract or an ordinary listing agreement. 1 The exclusive sales contract is considered bilateral in that
the seller promises to deal only with a purchaser produced by the broker and the
broker in turn promises to use reasonable efforts in procuring a purchaser. 2 In the
ordinary listing agreement, on the other hand, no exclusive rights are given to the
broker and such agreements generally are held to be only offers of unilateral
3
contracts.
Two possible situations may arise under an ordinary listing agreement and the
legal implications of each are somewhat different.4 In the one, the broker is given
all the essential and material terms upon which the seller wishes to sell; in the
other, all the essential and material terms are not disclosed to the broker. It is
the latter situation which faced the court in the principal case. In the first situation
the broker is entitled to his commission when he produces a buyer who is ready,
willing and able to buy on the proffered terms.0 In the second situation the broker
is not entitled to his commission until his prospective buyer becomes acquainted
1. Greenberg, Right of Real Estate Brokers to Compensation, 22 CoNi. B. J. 410 (1948).
Some courts make a distinction between an exclusive agency contract and an exclusive sale
contract. Basically they are identical except that in the former the owner reserves the
right to make a sale to a vendee procured through his own efforts as well as through the
broker's efforts. Blumenfeld v. Vermette, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 674 (Sup. Ct. 1940). Since the
brokerage contract is for personal services and not for the sale of land it is not within the
Statute of Frauds and need not be in writing unless a written contract is required by
statute in a particular jurisdiction. Wiederman v. Verschleiser, 95 Misc. 276, 159 N. Y.
Supp. 226 (Sup. Ct. 1916). Alabama, California, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma and
South Dakota are among the states which require a written memorandum.
2. Gallard Realty Co. v. Rogers Wire Works, 215 App. Div. 326, 213 N. Y. Supp. 616
(1st Dep't 1926); Slattery v. Cothran, 210 App. Div. 581, 206 N. Y. Supp. 576 (4th Dep't
1924); Leibow v. Tilson, 124 Misc. 743, 209 N. Y. Supp. 224 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
3. Note, 28 ORE. L. REv. 248 (1949); REsTATEmENT, Aorcicv § 445 (c) (1933). In
Siegel v. Rosenzweig, 129 App. Div. 547, 114 N. Y. Supp. 179 (2d Dep't 1908) the court
said: ". . . no right of action exists in favor of the owner against the broker for the
latter's failure to exercise a degree of diligence in obtaining a purchaser which the owner
might deem reasonable." Id. at 549, 114 N. Y. Supp. at 181.
4. This discussion excludes from its purview those brokerage agreements in which there
is contained a special provision requiring a fully executed sale as a condition precedent
to the payment of commissions. Under such a contract no commission is payable until
an enforceable and completed sale has been realized. Stern v. Gepo Realty Corp., 289 N. Y.
274, 45 N. E. 2d 440 (1942); Felleman v. Von Luckner, 234 App. Div. 787, 253 N. Y. Supp.
567 (2d Dep't 1931).
5. Arnold v. Schmeidler, 144 App. Div. 420, 129 N. Y. Supp. 408 (1st Dep't 1911).
6. House v. Homburg, 267 App. Div. 557, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 341 (4th Dep't 1944);
Walsh v. Braden, 252 App. Div. 621, 300 N. Y. Supp. 614 (1st Dep't 1937); Gallagher
v. Dullea, 199 App. Div. 119, 191 N. Y. Supp. 439 (3d Dep't 1921); Strout Farm Agency,
Inc. v. De Forest, 192 App. Div. 790, 183 N. Y. Supp. 119 (3d Dep't 1920); Brocher v.
Olcott, 130 Misc. 859, 224 N. Y. Supp. 715 (City Ct. 1927). See also Hoggatt v. John,
185 La. 227, 169 So. 69 (1936).
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with all the essential and material terms and is then ready, willing and able to buy
s
on these terms. 7 A dictum in Strout Farm Agency, Inc. v. Dc Forest indicates that
the essential
if
all
category-even
second
there might be a quasi-exception to the
terms were not listed by the seller, the broker might still be entitled to his commission if the evidence was such as to indicate "an ability and willingness on the
part of the proposed purchaser to comply with any reasonable terms which the
owner might exact." This argument, however, appears to be more theoretical than
real, since a buyer could hardly be held to assent in advance with a sufficient degree
of certainty to unknown terms to be proposed by the seller in the future.
Since the broker is not entitled to his commission and the contract of sale between the seller and buyer is not completed under the second situation noted above
until there is a meeting of the minds on all the essential terms and also until the
buyer is ready, willing and able to carry out his part of the agreement, it would
seem that the seller should have the right, before acceptance is completed, to
10
terminate his offer at any time without incurring liability." This rule has been
generally followed by the courts and has been held applicable even if a sale is
thereafter made by the seller to a buyer with whom the broker had been negotiating.12 The commonly recognized exception to this right of the seller to withdraw his offer and conclude the brokerage arrangement occurs when the termination
is brought about by bad faith on the part of the seller. This element of bad faith
seems to turn upon the question of whether or not there was an intention to avoid
the payment of commissions. 13
7. Ibid.
8.

192 App. Div. 790, 183 N. Y. Supp. 119 (3d Dep't 1920).

9. Id. at 793, 183 N. Y. Supp. at 121.
10. Siegel v. Rosenzweig, 129 App. Div. 547, 114 N. Y. Supp. 179 (2d Dep't 1903).
"It is entirely apparent, therefore, that the owner may, without notice to the broker,
absolutely revoke the authority in certain cases, provided, of course, it is done without
the purpose of defeating the broker in the collection of commissions which he has already
actually earned, and no one will assert that the broker has a right of action against the
owner for selling to the first party who offers the price asked, even though the broker
at that time has negotiations under way which bear the appearance of being succeful,
and even though the broker has not been accorded what might be deemed a reasonable
time in which to find a purchaser." Id. at 549, 114 N. Y. Supp. at 181. O'Hara v,. Murray,
144 App. Div. 113, 128 N. Y. Supp. 1009 (1st Dep't 1911). It has been held in some caes
that the broker should be allowed a reasonable time to procure a purchaser. Goodman v.
Marcol, 261 N. Y. 188, 184 N. E. 755 (1933); Donavan v. Weed, 182 N. Y. 43, 74 N. E.
563 (1905).
11. Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378 (1831); Globus Realty Corp. v.
Fleetwood Terrace, Inc., 275 App. Div. 34, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 141 (1st Dep't 1949). Note,
28 ORE. L. REv. 248, 249 (1949). "The owner may revoke the offer at any time prior to
acceptance, he may list the property with other brokers, or he may sell it to a purchaser
procured by himself or another without liability to the broker. Thus ordinary listings,
with respect to the real-estate broker are attended with all the apparent inequities and
hardships connected with unilateral offers. It does not matter how much time, money,
and effort the realtor has expended in advertising and showing the property...."
12. Gardner v. Pierce, 131 App. Div. 605, 116 N. Y. Supp. 155 (1st Dep't 1909);
see Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378, 383 (1881).
13. Goodman v. Marcol, 261 N. Y. 188, 184 N. E. 755 (1933); see Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378, 383 (1881).
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It is in the light of these established and governing principles that we must consider the questions presented in the principal case: May the plaintiff-broker recover
his commission even in the absence of an agreement between the buyer and the
seller (1) as to the amount to be paid upon the formal execution of the contract
and (2) as to the time for closing the title? Both the majority and minority opinions
in the principal case found that these were material and essential terms; 1 4 the
minority opinion pointing out that in Ansorge v. Kane15 the New York Court of
Appeals held that the amount of down payment was an "important element" of
the complete contract and that the law will imply nothing as to such terms. However, the majority opinion concluded that a complete agreement on all the essential
terms of the contract of sale would have been reached bad there not been a prevention by the defendant. 16 Thus, it held the broker was entitled to his commissions
and the seller was effectively estopped from declaring there was no meeting of the
minds since such a meeting was thwarted by the seller's own capricious conduct.
The majority holding appears to be unsound in implying that an agreement between the parties would have been reached had the negotiations been continued and
thus in forming a contract for the buyer and seller which was never in fact negotiated. All the essential and material terms of the agreement were not made known
to the prospective purchaser by the seller and in giving judicial cognizance to the
dictum in the Strout case the majority of the court in the instant case was treading
on delicate and somewhat impractical ground. As the dissent pointed out, the
proposed purchaser testified that it might entail between sixty and ninety days
delay before any closing might be arranged and that no seller, anxious to make a
sale, would be "willing to tie up such property for that length of time with no down
payment and upon such an indefinite arrangement. 1 7 This reasoning of the dissent
is supported by the decision in Haase v. Schneider18 where a disagreement arose as
to the time of the transfer of the property and other matters of detail and the
plaintiff-broker attempted to show an alleged custom in relation to the time of
taking title where no time has been agreed upon between the parties. The court
held: ". . . we are clearly of opinion that even though there was such a custom,
it could not give the plaintiffs any rights in this action. In order that the plaintiffs
might recover in this action, it was necessary for them to show that the parties
actually reached an agreement as to the terms and conditions of the sale, and this
they have failed to do, because it appears that the parties never agreed to the conditions which the defendant named, and which he had a perfect right to insist
upon." 19
The majority opinion, citing the Strout case 20 as authority, indicated that the
plaintiff could have recovered on a quantum meruit basis had he wished to proceed
14. Mengel v. Lawrence, 276 App. Div. 180, 183, 187, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 443, 446, 449
,(Ist Dep't 1949).

15. 244 N. Y. 395, 399, 155 N. E. 683, 685 (1927). In House v. Homburg, 267 App.
Div. 557, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 341 (4th Dep't 1944) the time for the closing of the transaction
and the time for the turning over possession were held to be such essential questions that
even though the sale was for cash, as in the instant case, the broker was not entitled to
his commissions when such matters were not agreed upon.
16. Mengel v. Lawrence, 276 App. Div. 180, 182, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 443, 446 (1st Dep't
1949).
17. Id. at 186, 93 N. Y. S. 2d at 449.

18. 112 App. Div. 336, 98 N. Y. Supp. 587 (2d Dep't 1906).
19. Id. at 337, 338, 98 N. Y. Supp. at 587, 588 (italics supplied).
20. 192 App. Div. 790, 183 N. Y. Supp. 119 (3d Dep't 1920) In that case, although
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on that theory. Applying the basic precepts of contract law relating to unilateral
offers, the defendant in a case such as the instant one should not be allowed to

recover on such a theory.21 It has been constantly reiterated that the broker is

never entitled to recover under the ordinary listing for unsuccessful efforts, regard22
Cases which have
less of the time he had expended or expenses he had incurred.
allowed a recovery qutantum. mneruit are those where there was an exclusive sale or
24
agency contract23 or where a definite time was fixed for the duration of the agency.

Even if the majority holding was correct in concluding that the proposed purchaser consented to all the essential and material terms of the agreement, the

plaintiff should not have recovered because he did not produce a purchaser who
was "ready, willing and able." Generally "to be able" means to be in a position

financially to meet the terms of payment specified by the seller. -s Therefore, the

terms of the sale have a determinative effect on whether a purchaser is able. For
if the terms provide for a cash sale as in the instant case, it is compulsory that
the purchaser have the legal tender with which to pay. The fact that he has property
out of which the required payment may be made is not sufficient. -O Nor is the

proposed purchaser "able" when he is depending on a third party who is in no way

bound to furnish the funds to make the purchase.27 In the principal case the purchaser himself testified that he never had $150,000 in cash; that he had no contract
with the third person mentioned under which the latter would be obligated to

provide the necessary amount in cash and, therefore, cannot be said to have the
financial ability, even though the third person knew of the proposed purchase of
the property.
On the facts in the instant case, it is submitted that the judgment of the lower
court should have been reversed and a judgment entered for defendant. Under
the principles of unilateral contracts, the acceptance by the broker must be completed before the seller is under a duty to render performance in the form of payment of commissions. It is suggested that the most prudent policy in similar
situations would be for the seller to insert a clause in the contract requiring a
completed sale before brokerage commissions are due. This would undoubtedly
result in a reduction of unnecessary litigation for both parties.
the brokerage contract was of the ordinary listing type, the court ignored the implications
of a unilateral contract, and concluded that the seller had wrongfully terminated the
broker's contract, thus allowing a recovery quantum ineruit. However, that reasoning has
not been applied in any other case since that decision.
21.

RE STATEm ,T, Co-nvmcTs, N. Y. AaxOT. § 45 (1933).

22. Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378 (1881); Siegel v. Rosenzeig, 129
App. Div. 547, 114 N. Y. Supp. 179 (2d Dep't 1908); REsTAT=MET, AGENC"Y § 445 (c)
(1933).
23. Slattery v. Cothran, 210 App. Div. 581, 206 N. Y. Supp. 576 (4th Dep't 1924);
Bathrick v. Coffin, 13 App. Div. 101, 43 N. Y. Supp. 313 (2d Dep't 1897).
24. Baker v. Angell, 46 Hun 679 (N. Y. 1887).
25. Pellaton v. Brunski, 69 Cal. App. 301, 231 Pac. 583 (1924).
26. Reynor v. Mackrill, 181 Iowa 210, 164 N. W. 335 (1917); Schnitzer v. Price,
122 App. Div. 409, 106 N. Y. Supp. 767 (2d Dep't 1907). In Watters v. Dancey, 23 S. D.
481, 122 N. W. 430 (1909) the court held that where the contract with the broker provided for a sale of the property for "all cash over the encumbrance", the proof must show
that the proposed purchaser bad the cash in hand; and evidence that he had an abundance
of property out of which the required payment might be made is not sufficient.
27. McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. 221 (U. S. 1857); Abbott v. Floyd, 136 Cal. App.
365, 28 P. 2d 929 (1934); Mattingly v. Pennie, 105 Cal. 514, 39 Pac. 200 (1895).
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OF PROFIT TO DIRECTORS ON CORPORATE BONDS PUR-

DURING INSOLVENCy.-Unable to meet its obligations a corporate debtor
filed a petition proposing an arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.
The arrangement provided for a dividend of 43.61% of the principal amount of
the corporate bonds. Under this plan the respondent bondholders would receive a
dividend of $64,237.53 on bonds having a face value of $147,300.00 which they had
purchased for $10,195.43 before the petition for arrangement had been filed but
while the debtor, though insolvent, was a going concern. The petitioner, as a
creditor for fees and disbursements owed it as indenture trustee and as original
indenture trustee, objected to the allowance on the respondents' bonds under the
plan of arrangement on the ground that the respondents, close relatives and an office
associate of directors, acquired their bonds under circumstances which should limit
their recovery to the actual consideration paid for the bonds plus interest. The
District Court affirmed the referee's dismissal of petitioner's objection. Upon affirm.
ance by a divided Court of Appeals, petitioner, with the Securities and Exchange
Commission as arnicus curiae, appealed. Held, two Justices dissenting, affirmed on
the ground that where there is good faith and fair dealing the directors of an
insolvent but going concern will not be limited to the purchase price in enforcing
claims against the corporation purchased at a discount. Manufacturers Trust Co. v.
Becker, 338 U. S. 304 (1949).
A director or officer of a corporation does not stand, in the true sense, in a
trust capacity with the corporation.' The general rule is, therefore, that such
officers and directors may take part in transactions with or concerning their corporation on which a profit results to them personally. 2 But this non-prohibition
against profiting in such transactions is not unlimited; the director cannot deal
at arm's length with his corporation.8 His dealings must be in good faith and
inherently fair. The courts use the language that a director may profit in transactions with or concerning his corporation, e.g., buying corporate bonds or obligations, "when the transaction is fair to the corporation and involves no competition with it";4 but not where "there is overreaching or injury to the corporation."'
CHASED

1. The Court in the instant case held inapplicable the strict rule laid down in Magruder
v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106 (1914) that a trustee can make no profit from his trust since
corporate assets during insolvency are not trusts.
2. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943) It
was held that purchases of preferred stock during reorganization by officers and directors
was not a violation of their fiduciary duty according to equitable principles or established
judicial doctrine. The Court reversed a ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commission
that the "'duty of fair dealing' which the management owes to the stockholders is violated if those in control of the corporation purchase its stock, even at a fair price, openly
and without fraud." Id. at 87. Seymour v. The Spring Forest Cemetery Ass'n, 144 N. Y.
333, 39 N. E. 365 (1895).
3. "A director is an officer of a corporation. As such, he represents the corporation,
and all of his dealings with the corporation will be carefully scrutinized. He will be held
to the highest degree of honesty and the best of faith in all of his dealings with the corporation." Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F. 2d 725, 726 (10th Cir. 1943).
4. Ripperger v. Allyn, 25 F. Supp. 554, 555 (S.D. N. Y. 1938) (directors not permitted to profit on claims which they purchased when such purchases were in competition
with their corporation's purchases). In re McCrory Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.
N. Y. 1935).
5. In re Philadelphia & Western Ry., 64 F. Supp. 738, 739 (E. D. Pa. 1946).
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In the leading case of Seymour v. Thx Spring Forest Cemetcry Ass'n,0 the court
stated the following rule: "Unless some special fund has been provided, or some
special liquidation has been ordered, the director owes no duty to his company to
discharge or buy in the outstanding bonds, and may purchase for himself because
no inconsistent trust duty has arisen.' 7 When this duty of fair dealing is questioned,
"the burden is on the director . .. not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation
and those interested therein." s
The prohibition against profit-producing transactions on the part of a corporate
director or officer does arise in a limited number of situations, i.e., where the director
owes a duty to his corporation which develops from his relationship to the corporation. Two such situations in which this duty is said to exist (and thus constitute
exceptions to the general rule) are: (1) where he is under a duty to buy claims
against the corporation for the benefit of the corporation;0 (2) when the corporation
is insolvent. From the cases it appears that insolvency in itself is not sufficient to
preclude a director from profiting in such transactions. The position of the corporation must be that it is expecting or is in a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act. 10
Under such conditions the courts refuse a profit to corporate officers to insure
that they will act in the best interests of their corporation, rather than a possible
personal interest. Justice Burton, in his dissenting opinion in the instant case, gave
an excellent example of such a conflict of interests: "It may be necessary for them
[the directors] to choose between a corporate policy of reorganization which might
be best for the corporation and one of liquidation which might yield more certain
profits to them as noteholding directors."1'
This statement of a Kentucky court,
"human nature is not so constituted that the same person can fairly represent
opposing sides of the same question--cannot be both creditor and debtor.... The
policy of the law is to insure fidelity of trustees to their trusts by making it impossible for them to profitably neglect or abuse them,"' 2 was quoted with approval by
6. 144 N. Y. 333, 39 N. E. 365 (1895).
7. Id. at 344, 39 N. E. at 367.
8. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 306 (1939).
9. In re Franklin Building Co., 178 F. 2d 805 (7th Cir. 1949), a member of a bondholders committee was limited to the purchase price in his recovery on bonds of the
insolvent corporation purchased during insolvency; in Kroegher v. Calivada Colonization
Co., 119 Fed. 641 (3d Cir. 1902), a director was not allowed to profit on claims against
the corporation which he purchased in breach of an express trust which constituted him
an agent of the corporation to purchase claims against the corporation; Ripperger v. Allyn,
25 F. Supp. 554 (S. D. N. Y. 1938), where the directors had prevented the corporation
from purchasing claims against itself in order to profit on the purchases personally; In re
McCrory Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 267 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
10. In re Franklin Building Co., 178 F. 2d 805 (7th Cir. 1949); Monroe v. Scofield,
135 F. 2d 725 (10th Cir. 1943); In re Norcor Mfg. Co., 109 F. 2d 407 (7th Cir. 1940);
In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 46 F. Supp. 77 (S. D. Cal. 1941). In the above
cases the corporation was in either bankruptcy or reorganization proceedings.
11. 338 U. S. 304, 316 (1949).
12. Bramblet v. Commonwealth Land and Lumber Co., 26 Ky. L. 1176, 1179, 83 S. W.
599, 602 (1904).
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the court in In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. 13
As a general rule where a fiduciary is barred from enforcing a claim his wife is
also barred. 14 The same rule is applied where a director procures another to act
10
Where
for or with him in a transaction which is a breach of his fiduciary duty.
the
against
buy
claims
of
a
corporation
relatives or close associates of a director
corporation in their own names and with their own funds, which they seek to
enforce at a profit, they are not limited in their recovery if they can establish
that they are not acting for the director.' 6
In the instant case the petitioner asserted that directors of a corporation are
precluded from profiting on claims against their corporation purchased at a large
discount while the corporation was insolvent, and that the respondents, because of
their relationship to the directors, should likewise be limited to the actual price which
they paid for the bonds plus interest. The Court rejected this contention because
the material facts presented no circumstances under which the directors themselves
would be limited if they had purchased the bonds in question.
The majority opinion, considering the principal case as one in between the case
where a purchase is made during solvency of the corporation and one where insolvency proceedings are expected or have begun, found it unnecessary to determine
precisely at what point the dividing line would be reached, since it was not reached
in the case at bar. 17 Moreover, the findings negatived lack of good faith and competition with the corporation and disclosed efforts upon the part of the directors
and respondents to benefit the corporation. The majority's conclusion is further
strengthened by the findings of fact' 8 that there was no use of inside information l o or
overreaching20 in making the purchases.
judge Learned Hand's dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals and that of
justice Burton in the Supreme Court make it clear that to a great extent the difference
between the majority and minority in both courts did not depend upon any fundamental dispute concerning the applicable substantive law but rather in the degree
of the burden resting upon directors, or those closely connected with them, to negative the possibility of conflict of interests when the purchases were made.
46 F. Supp. 77, 91 (S. D. Cal. 1941).
14. Halmon v. Ryan, 56 F. 2d 307, 311 (D. C. 1932).
15. In re The Van Swerigen Co., 119 F. 2d 231 (6th Cir. 1941). "It seems soundly
settled that one who knowingly joins a fiduciary in purchasing for profit the property of
the trust estate in unlawful circumstances becomes jointly and severally liable with him
for resultant profits." Id. at 234.
16. In re Franklin Building Co., 178 F. 2d 805 (7th Cir. 1949).
17. The majority opinion, commenting on Judge Learned Hand's dissenting opinion in
the Court of Appeals, agreed that "if in fact liquidation had been imminent at the time
of respondents' purchases or if it were fairly demonstrable, as a matter of experience,
that a director free from all potential self-interest would be more likely to initiate liquidation proceedings or to effect a debt settlement than one not wholly disinterested, a court
of equity should explore such issues and not dismiss them out of hand." 338 U. S. 304,
13.

315 (1949).

18.

Such findings may be found in the opinion of the District Court, 80 F. Supp. 822

(1948), and Court of Appeals, 173 F. 2d 944 (1949).
19.
20.

See 12 FoRD. L. REv. 282 (1943).
Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909).
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DAmAGES-DESTRUCTION

OF CHATTEL-LOST

PRoTrrs AS PART Or DAMAGES.-

Plaintiff's truck and bulldozer were destroyed in 1946 as a result of the negligent
operation of defendant's vehicle. Plaintiff recovered the value of his vehicles at the
time and place of the accident less salvage value plus the profit he would have made
by their use during the period he was unable to replace them because of post-var
shortages. Defendant appealed from that portion of the judgment which allowed
plaintiff to recover for lost use. Held, affirmed on the ground that the measure of
damages for the destruction or conversion of a chattel is not limited to value at
the time and place of such destruction or conversion but may include other items
of special damage if such are proved with certainty. Giddo et al. v. Hudson Transit
Lies, Inc., 178 F. 2d 740 (3d Cir. 1950).
The object of the law of damages is to compensate the injured party for the
wrong done him, i.e., in the case of a tort to put him in the same position he would
have been in if the tort had not occurred.1 In the usual case of a conversion or
destruction of a chattel this compensation is achieved by application of the general
rule which fixes damages as the value of the chattel at the time and place of conversion or destruction.2 This principle offers a workable formula for it establishes
the precise amount of money plaintiff would have needed at the time of the wrong
in order to replace the chattel and thus put himself in the same position he would
have been in if the wrong had not been suffered. It is apparent, however, that such
a measure of damages cannot make the plaintiff whole in every situation since it
assumes that plaintiff has enough money on hand to replace his loss immediately,
and also that immediate or same-day replacement can in fact be made. Thus it often
happens that, due to the plaintiff's blameless inability to replace, a blind adherence
to the general principle will result in losses greater than the actual chattel converted
or destroyed.
Obviously, if there is no market value for the chattel in question or if the saleable
value does not represent the true worth of the article, 3 viz., wearing apparel or
household goods, plaintiff is allowed to recover the value of the chattel to him.'
Where the tort of conversion as opposed to the tort of negligence has been committed, courts usually discard the general rule which limits recovery to the value
of the chattel at the time and place of conversion when the plaintiff can show
special damages.5 A requirement that defendant must have some knowledge of the
special circumstances at the time of the tort has been made by some courts.0 Special
1. RESTAzimENT, ToRTs § 901a (1939).
2.

RESTATEa1m.T, ToRTs §§ 910, 927 (1940).

3. Lake v. Dye, 232 N. Y. 209, 133 N. E. 448 (1921). The expression "market value"
is very frequently used in the broad sense of exchange value, ie., what a willing purchaser
will pay a willing seller. See Standard Oil Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 268 U. S. 146, 155

(1925).

However, in order to apply market value as the precise measure of damages,

simply proved by establishing the price in the market, there must be a market, ix., "a
broad market with frequent trading in articles of an identical character with the article
lost." McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N. Y. 176, 182, 159 N. E. S02, 904 (1928).
4. Blauvelt v. Cleveland, 198 App. Div. 229, 190 N. Y. Supp. 881 (4th Dep't 1921).
5. 4 Surn A-um, DAuA Es § 1129 (4th ed. 1916).
6. McGuire v. Galligan, 57 Mich. 38, 23 N. W. 479 (1885); McKnight v. Carmichael,
7 Tex. Civ. App. 270, 27 S. W. 150 (1894). Such a requirement seems unsound since
defendant in a wilful tort action is responsible for all the proximate consequences of his
wrong whether or not they were foreseen. Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N. W. 403
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damages which have been allowed under this exception to the general rule include
reasonable expenses incurred in attempting to recover possession of the converted
chattel whether successful or not;7 profits or wages lost while the stolen chattel
was gone; 8 and in the case where the chattel has been returned, the value of the
lost use during the intervening period. 9 The court in the instant case held that
the rule of damages for a negligent destruction of a chattel is the same as that for
a conversion and that such rule should make defendant liable for all the injury
proximately caused by his wrongful act if plaintiff can prove such with certainty.
In the principal case defendant sought to have the court adopt a distinction
between the principles governing the measure of damages in cases of destruction
and cases of injury to chattels. Case and text authorities are not lacking to support
defendant's position.' 0 Courts, which limit a plaintiff's recovery to the value at
the time and place of destruction or conversion, allow a plaintiff, in the case of
repairable injury to a chattel, to recover for lost use while the chattel is being
repaired, in addition to the difference between the value immediately before and
after the injury." They reason that because of defendant's wrong plaintiff's investment is forced to lay idle while being repaired; but by allowing recovery of full
value in the case of destruction or conversion, plaintiff's investment is fully re.
stored.' 2 Such a result indicates the impracticability of the assumption behind the
(1891). The rule of foreseeability more properly applies to breaches of contract. Hadley
v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
7. Parroski v. Goldberg, 80 Wis. 339, 50 N. W. 191 (1891).
8. Smalling v. Jackson, 133 App. Div. 382, 117 N. Y. Supp.' 268 (2d Dep't 1909);
Djidics v. Wishnevsky, 179 N. Y. Supp. 99 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1919); Wilson v. Press
Pub. Co., 14 Misc. 514, 36 N. Y. Supp. 12 (Gen. Term 1895).
9. Fields v. Williams, 91 Ala. 502, 8 So. 808 (1891). Contra: Flagler v. Hearst, 91 App.
Div. 12, 86 N. Y. Supp. 308 (1st Dep't 1904).
10. Burrage v. Tri-State Transit Co., 149 So. 125 (La. 1933); Colonial Motor Coach
Corp. v. New York Cent. R.R., 131 Misc. 891, 228 N. Y. Supp. 508 (Sup. Ct. 1928);
Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. v. Tarver, 148 Ohio St. 82, 73 N. E. 2d 192 (1947); 1 SEDowicx,
DArAGEs § 178 (9th ed. 1920).
11. Parilli v. Brooklyn City R.R., 236 App. Div. 577, 260 N. Y. Supp. 60 (2d Dep't
1932). There are several rules in less-than-total-destruction cases varying with the details
of the proof or the particular court's preference. When repair has actually been made
before suit, plaintiff may recover the reasonable costs plus or minus the diminution or
enhancement of the value. Langham v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 201 Iowa 897, 208 N. W.
356 (1926). When the chattel has not been repaired or is not expected to be repaired,
plaintiff may recover the reasonable cost of repair plus or minus the change to be effected
in the market value. Hopper, McGaw & Co. v. Kelly, 145 Md. 161, 125 Atl, 779 (1924).
Regardless of the repair plaintiff may recover the difference between the value before
and after the wrong with the actual cost of repair considered generally as evidence of
this depreciation. Webb v. O'Kelly, 213 Ala. 214, 104 So. 505 (1925). In the jurisdictions
which follow the first two rules enunciated above the value for lost use is always allowed
while where the last recited rule obtains there are a few states which do not allow for
lost use. Helin v. Egger, 121 Neb. 727, 238 N. W. 364 (1931). The Restatement allows
plaintiff an election of any one of the three rules and grants value of lost use regardless
of which theory is chosen. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 928 (1940).
12. Burrage v. Tri-State Transit Co., 149 So. 125 (La. 1933); Colonial Motor Coach
Corp. v. New York Cent. R.R., 131 Misc. 891, 228 N. Y. Supp. 508 (Sup. Ct. 1928);
Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. v. Tarver, 148 Ohio St. 82, 73 N. E. 2d 192 (1947).
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above discussed general rule for, though it does not assume that an injured chattel
can be repaired immediately, it does assume that a plaintiff can immediately replace
a destroyed chattel But it has been suggested that there should be no difference
between the two situations since in each the plaintiff's investment might be useless
to him until either he has repaired it or has replaced it.3 Even in injury cases
where damages for lost use are allowed, plaintiff may not recover a sum totalling
more than the actual value at the time and place of the injury. 14 Such limitation
ignores the basic object of the law of damages by applying a general rule of thumb
to cases where its application cannot requite the plaintiff for the injury which
defendant has done him.15
It is submitted that a rule allowing special damages, if pleaded and proved,
regardless of the type of tort in question does not overthrow the old rule of value
at the time and place of conversion-for a plaintiff may always recover at least thisbut merely holds that such rule is not absolute and must be discarded when special
circumstances are shown. The theory of general tort law is consistent with recovery for all the proximate results of a negligent destruction of a chattel, as allowed
in the instant case. G But on the strict theory of a tortious conversion, i.e., a forced
sale, it is technically inconsistent to allow more than the value of the chattel at
time and place of conversion plus interest.' 7 But since even on the theory it is a
"forced" sale which is thrust on plaintiff it seems in accord with the spirit of the
present law to make recovery dependent on the injury suffered and not on the form
of action pursued.' 8
The holding in the instant case must be acclaimed for presenting a rule for determining the amount of recovery based solely on the relation between the wrong of
the defendant and the resultant injury to the plaintiff; thus making recovery independent of the nature of the action brought and unfettered by the general rule of
thumb which is necessarily determined by the injury that another plaintiff suffered
from the wrong of another defendant in other circumstances.

DAM.IAGES-REcOvERY rOR MENTAL ANGUISH fL CONTRACr

AcrioN.-The plaintiff

entered into a contract with defendant undertaker to inter the body of her deceased
husband. The defendant allegedly defaulted in his agreement in that he failed
properly to secure the lid of the vault into which the casket of the deceased had
been laid. As a result, the vault, following a rainy spell of weather, had arisen above
13. Louisville & I. R.R. v. Schuester, 183 Ky. 504, 209 S. W. 542 (1919).
14. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Harrell, 66 F. Supp. S59 (W. D. Okla. 1946); Cass v.
Agate Ice Cream, Inc., 264 N. Y. 141, 190 N. E. 323 (1934). See Brandon v. Capital
Transit Co., 71 A. 2d 621, 623 (D. C. Mun. App. 1950).
15. See note 2 supra.
16.

RESTATEarET, ToRTs

§

917 (1940).

17. In the case of a negligent wrong to property an award of interest is in the discretion
of the jury, while in an intentional wrong to property it is a matter of right. See Wilson
v. City of Troy, 135 N. Y. 96, 105, 32 N. E. 44 (1892). But see Flamm v. Noble, 296
N. Y. 262, 268, 72 N. E. 2d 886, 888 (1947); Felder v. Reeth, 34 F. 2d 744, 74S (9th
Cir. 1929).
18. If plaintiff sued in replevin for the return of the goods no ale would be effected
and plaintiff could recover for the lost use. Tannenbaum Son & Co. v. C. Ludwig Baumann
& Co., 261 N. Y. 85, 184 N. E. 503 (1933).
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the level of the ground. Consequently reinterment became necessary. During this
process, to which plaintiff was a witness, it was discovered that water and mud had
entered into the vault and that the casket was wet. The plaintiff alleged that on
seeing this she suffered extreme mental anguish. An action was commenced for
breach of the contract to conduct the funeral and inter the body and for breach
of warranty in the sale of the vault. The trial court dismissed the breach of warranty action and submitted to the jury this sole issue: "Did the defendants by
their unlawful, wilful negligence and carelessness in the burial of the body of the
husband of the plaintiff cause the plaintiff to suffer injury and damages as alleged?"
The jury answered in the negative and judgment was thereby rendered for defendant.
On appeal, held, one justice dissenting, judgment of the trial court reversed on the
ground that it was error to submit the issue of negligence to the jury in that this
was essentially an action in damages for breach of contract, not tort. Mental anguish
is a proper element of damages in such an action. Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S. E. 2d
810 (N. C. 1949).
Although mental anguish allegedly following a wilful tort or negligent act which
results in an actual physical injury is now universally considered a compensable
ground for recovery in tort,' no such precise uniformity exists when the same item
of damage is alleged in a cause of action for breach of contract.
Generally damages for mental anguish are not recoverable when the cause of
action is based on a commercial contract since the parties thereto are covenanting
primarily on the basis of realizing some pecuniary or proprietary advantage and the
law seeks to satisfy only this lost advantage in the case of a breach.2 The lack of
uniformity in the authorities pervades those contract actions where the agreement
is for personal services in which one party is to be compensated for satisfying a
purely personal need of the other. Such a contract is involved in the instant case.
The most simple and most sound approach to these cases is afforded by a realistic
application of the principle set out in that landmark of the law of damages, Hadley
v. Baxendale:3 Where the parties knew or reasonably should have known at the time
the contract was entered into that mental grievance would follow a breach, such
4
damages should be compensable. This rule has been adopted in many jurisdictions
1. LaSalle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N. W. 424 (1934);
O'Brien v. Moss, 220 App. Div. 464, 221 N. Y. Supp. 621 (4th Dep't 1927); 1 COOLEY,
TORTS § 73 (3d ed. 1906); 1 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES § 21 (4th ed. 1916); RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 905g (1939).
2. Smith v. Sanborn State Bank, 147 Iowa 640, 126 N. W. 779 (1910); Clark v. Life
& Casualty Ins. Co., 245 Ky. 579, 53 S. W. 2d 968 (1932); McCoRMxticx, DAMAGOES § 145
(1935) ; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1340 A (rev. ed. 1937); Developments in the LawDamages 1935-1947, 61 HARv. L. REv. 113, 141 (1947). See Beaulleu v. Great Northern
Ry., 103 Minn. 47, 50, 114 N. W. 353, 354 (1907).
3. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). See also 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1340 A
(rev. ed. 1937); McCoRaucx, DAMAGES § 145 (1935).
4. Brown Funeral Homes & Ins. Co. v. Baughn, 226 Ala. 661, 148 So. 154 (1933);
Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Murphy, 224 Ala. 655, 141 So. 630 (1932); Fitzsimmons
v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P. 2d 535 (1932); Wright v. Beardsley, 46
Wash. 16, 89 Fac. 172 (1907).
Other well known decisions which apply the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale in allowing
recovery for mental anguish are the telegraph cases: Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill,
163 Ala. 18, 50 So. 248 (1909); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495,
129 So. 743 (1930); Young v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 107 N. C. 370, 11 S. E. 1044
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and it is grounded in the firm concept that the recovery of any compensatory damages
is a matter of fact depending not only on whether or not the damages were actually
suffered, but also whether they were or should have been reasonably within the
contemplation of the parties when they made their bargain. The court's charge
eliminated the application of any such measure of damages.
Many jurisdictions have made no distinction between personal service and commercial contracts5 and have steadfastly adhered to the somewhat unrealistic principle that no cause of action in contract, ipso facto, comprehends mental anguish
as part of the damage. These courts maintain that the pecuniary consideration
involved, however slight, overrides a contemplation of the largely personal and
highly speculative mental condition of one of the parties.0
The Restatement of Contracts has advanced a rule for allowing recovery for mental anguish in contract actions without regard to the type of contract involved.
Its test is: If there has been a wilful and wanton breach, the party suffering thereby
should be compensated for any mental anguish actually resulting therefrom. 7 While
its analogy to tort actions commends it, this approach is considerably weakened,
if not nullified, by its own inconsistency with more settled principles of contract
damages. The wilfullness of the breach has never been a consideration in contract
actions, as the Restatement recognizes, and the soundly established rule that only
those damages should be weighed which the parties contemplated at the time the
contract was made would be arbitrarily discarded in large measure by the addition
of the rule of wilful breach.
Yet another solution to the problem of recovery for mental anguish in contrast is
afforded by the New York courts. Here the general rule that no such damage is
recoverable is excepted to when the breach coincides with a public ejectment. 10
In Aaron v. Ward" the plaintiff, having purchased a ticket of admission to the
defendant's bathing beach and having wrongfully been refused admittance, was
publicly ordered to leave. Although she alleged no physical injury, the court distinguished the mental pain and humiliation she suffered at this breach from that
(1890). But cf. Chase v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 44 Fed. 554 (N. D. Ga. 1890);
Thompson v. Western Union Telegraph Co. 107 N. C. 449, 12 S. E. 427 (1850); Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Choteau, 28 Okla. 664, 115 Pac. 879 (1911). These decisions
allowing recoveries for mental anguish, however, are in a class by themselves since the
courts proceeded on both principles of tort and contract.
5. Wilcox v. Richmond & D. R.R., 52 Fed. 264 (4th Cir. 1892); Plummer v. Hollis,
213 Ind. 43, 11 N. E. 2d 140 (1937); Beaulieu v. Great Northern Ry., 103 Blinn. 47, 114
N. W. 353 (1907); Norton v. Kull, 74 Misc. 476, 132 N. Y. Supp. 387 (Sup. CL 1911).
6. Wilcox v. Richmond & D. R.R., 52 Fed. 264, 266 (4th Cir. 1892). See Deelopments
in the Law-Damages 1935-1947, 61 HAxv. L. Ra,. 113, 138 (1947).
7.

RESTATE--T, CONTRACTS § 341 (1932).

8. RESTATimT, CONTRAcTS § 342 (1932). See also Holland v. Spartenburg HeraldJournal Co., 166 S. C. 454, 165 S. E. 203 (1932); 5 WxisTo., Co,'Tcm § 1340 (rev.
ed. 1937).
9. Kellogg v. Commodore Hotel, Inc., 187 Misc. 319, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 131 (Sup. Ct. 1946);
Norton v. Kull, 74 Misc. 746, 132 N. Y. Supp. 387 (Sup. CL 1911).
10. Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., 228 N. Y. 105, 126 N. E. 647 (1920).
11. 203 N. Y. 351, 96 N. E. 736 (1911). It was in this case that the court made the
distinction between the cases involving a public ejectment and those in which mental
anguish is asserted on an independent basis.
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anguish which is alleged to follow the breach of an ordinary contract. This limited
recognition of the part which human feelings play in agreements of this sort is
apparently as far as New York has gone in countenancing the award of damages
for mental anguish. However the value of such recognition is minimized by its arbitrariness, which prevents its application to other situations wherein mental grievance
is an obviously primary factor in the actual damage suffered. This arbitrariness is
emphasized by the New York courts' former approach to the "heart-balm" suits, now
abolished by statute.12 In these cases the courts found no trouble in comprehending
that the contracts were so predominantly personal that mental anguish was almost
the sole damage contemplated by the parties when the contract was made.13 Today
this striking anomaly in New York law does not exist, but its unrealistic basis
lingers on in the public ejectment cases and the lawyer is confronted with a general
rule, though rigid, far more logical than its one exception.
The most realistic theory is the one suggested by the court in the instant case.
It is not unreasonable to suppose that where only purely personal satisfaction is
bargained for for a party or where his personal feelings are mutually considered to be
of more importance to him than monetary gain, the breach of the other party will
cause mental pain which should be recompensed.

STATUTES-EXTENT AND APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT WITHOUT
THE UNITED STATEs.-An action for wrongful death was commenced against the

United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act by the administratrix of the
estate of a pilot killed in a plane crash at Harmon Field, Newfoundland. It was
alleged that the United States was negligent in the operation of the leased base
and a right of action existed under the Act, based upon Newfoundland's wrongful
death statute, even though Newfoundland was not within the territorial limits of
the United States. The district court held that Harmon Field was a foreign country
within the meaning of the provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act excluding claims
"arising in a foreign country" and consequently that no action existed without the
government's consent to be sued. The judgment of the District Court was reversed
by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeals, held,
that Newfoundland was a "foreign country" within the meaning or the statute.
United States v. Spelar, 338 U. S.217 (1949).
Not since the turn of the century when the famous Insular Tariff cases were
decided have the federal courts until recently considered the controversial question
of the extent and applicability of federal laws without the territorial limits of the
United States. From the cases of DeLima v. Bidwell' and Downes v. Bidwel 2 the
doctrine of territorial incorporation was developed, i.e., if a territory was incorpo.
rated into the United States, the Constitution applied fully; if not, fundamental
rights are guaranteed but not procedural rights. The purpose of the distinction was
to allow Congress a large discretion in legislating for the latter areds with their
separate and distinct concepts and customs.3
12. N. Y. Civ. Pmac. ACT § 61-a.
13.

Chellis v. Chapman, 125 N. Y. 214, 26 N. E. 308 (1891)

1. 182 U. S.1 (1901).
2. 182 U. S.244 (1901). See also BaIzac v.Puerto Rico, 258 U. S.298 (1922).
3. Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of TerritorialIncorporation,26 COL. L.REv.
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The question reappears today as a result of territorial acquisitions during World
War II, particularly the leased bases acquired from England for 99 years through
the famous "destroyer deal." 4 The reversal by the Court of Appeals8 stemmed
from the decision of the Supreme Court in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Conne110 in
which a divided court held that a leased Bermuda military base was a "possession"
within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act which was statutorily declared
applicable to "any territory or possession of the United States.", By virtue of
this holding employees of American contractors engaged in the construction of a
military base in Bermuda were held to be covered by the Act. A majority of the
Court argued that the term "possession" in the Act was of uncertain meaning and
ambiguous, especially in view of the fact that the Fair Labor Standards Act was
passed in 1938 when no thought was given to the status of possible leased bases and
the applicability of the Act to such bases. The Court's approach then was to place
a construction on the statute in the light of the policy of the Congress in enacting
this legislation. Although recognizing that the leased area was under the sovereignty
of Great Britain and that it was not a territory of the United States in a political
sense, the majority nonetheless held the Act applicable since the dispute was between
American subjects concerning an American statute in a geographical area where the
United States had some measure of jurisdiction and control. It found that it was
the purpose of Congress to regulate labor relations in an area vital to our natural
prosperity and not to limit the coverage to places over which the United States
exercised sovereignty.8 Moreover, the Court deduced that since Congress has been
held to have the power to regulate criminal actions of citizens in foreign countries
directly affecting the United States without affecting "the dignity or right of
sovereignty of another nation," that dignity would no more tend to be offended by
the application of this federal statute. 9
The dissent in the Vermilya-Brown case claimed that there was no ambiguity in
the use of the term "possession"; rather the question was whether the Bermuda
base came within the meaning of that term. Since this question was a political
one,' 0 its answer, the minority believed, should involve the political aspects of
declaring a leased base to be a United States "possession." Our State Department
had already made known its position" that enough ill-will had been engendered
because of the happenings on and about these leased bases and warned against
823 (1926); Note, Applicability of Federal Statutes to Noncontiguous Areas, 97 U. or PA.
L. REv. 866, 867 (1949).

4. 55 STAr. 1560 (1941), arts. XIV (1) C, XIII (1) (1941).
5. 171 F. 2d 208 (2d Cir. 1948). Previous federal court decisions had consistently held
that occupied areas were "foreign countries" and not within the coverage of the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Brewer v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 405 (N. D. Cal. 1943) (Okinawa);
Straneri v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (Ghent, Belgium); Brunell v.
United States, 77 F. Supp. 68 (S. D. N. Y. 1948) (Saipan). For a caifcation of areas,
see Note, 97 U. or PA. L. Rav. 866, 867 (1949).
6. 335 U. S.377 (1948).
7. Ibid.
8. Id. at 389.
9. Id. at 381. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 437 (1932); United States
v. Bowman, 260 U. S.94, 102 (1922).
10. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U. S.377, 401 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
11. Ibid.
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further breaking down our relations with Great Britain by declaring the bases our
"possessions." Consequently, the dissent concluded that the bases should not be
declared "possessions" of the United States within the meaning of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
An analogous question came before the Supreme Court in March of 1949 in
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo.'2 The issue presented was whether the Federal Eight
Hour Law 13 was applicable to a contract between the United States and a private
contractor for construction work on military bases in a foreign country not under
lease to the United States, namely, Iraq and Iran. The Supreme Court held that
the law was inapplicable; first, because nothing in the Act indicated that it was the
intention of Congress that the law should extend its coverage beyond places where
the United States has sovereignty or legislative control; second, that nothing in
the legislative history which concerned domestic labor conditions indicated that the
law was applicable to foreign military bases; and third, administrative interpretations
of the law lent no support to the scope of its applicability. The reasoning of the
Court seemed to indicate that the Court had backtracked somewhat from its position of statutory interpretation in the Vermnilya-Brown case. In the Filardo case the
words of the Statute, "every contract made to which the United States . . . is a
party", 14 would have allowed the Court more freedom in applying a federal labor
statute in a case involving American litigants than did the word "possessions" in
the Fair Labor Standards Act, for in the latter the Court by a process of judicial
legislation in effect had to annex the land of a foreign sovereignty. The Court,
however, distinguished its holding in the Verinilya-Brown case. 1 6
In order to emphasize the complicating difficulties and effects of the decision in
the Vermilya-Broun case on the executive and administrative departments of the
United States Mr. Justice Frankfurter added as an appendix to his concurring
opinion in the Filardo case a letter written to the Solictor General of the United
States by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Divisions
of the United States Department of Labor.'( In this letter it was stated that in
considering the territorial aspects of wage-hour coverage in the past, the department
has proceeded on the assumption that traditional concepts of sovereign control
were implicit in the meaning of the phrase "any territory or possession of the
United States" as that phrase is used in the Fair Labor Standards Act and gave
particular weight to authoritative expressions of the State Department and other
12.

13.
40 U.
14.
U. S.

336 U. S. 281 (1949).

27 STAT. 340 (1892), 40 U. S. C. § 321 (1946), as amended, 37 STAT. 726 (1913),
S. C. § 321 (1946).
37 STAT. 137 (1912), 40 U. S. C. § 324 (1946), as amended, 62 STAT. 989, 40
C. § 324 (Supp. 1948).

15. "The situation here is different from that in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, where
we held that by specifically declaring that the Act covered 'possessions' of the United
States, Congress directed that the Fair Labor Standards Act applied beyond those areas
over which the United States has sovereignty and was in effect in all 'possessions'. This
Court concluded that the leasehold there involved was a 'possession' within the meaning
of the Fair Labor Standards Act. There is no language in the Eight Hour Law, here In
question, that gives any indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond
places over which the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative
control." 336 U. S. 281, 285 (1949).

16.

Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U. S. 281, 296 (1949) (appendix).
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governmental agencies on the question of what areas are viewed as territories or
possessions over which the United States exercises full sovereign rights. The letter
then discussed the problems that will confront the department as a result of the
Vernilya-Brown decision.
The Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity in the principal case to
set at rest some of the uncertainty developing out of the Vermilya-Brown decision.
Previous federal court decisions'- had consistently held that occupied areas were
8
"foreign countries" and not within the coverage of the Federal Tort Claims AcL
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the instant case,10 however, held
that since the Newfoundland base was a "possession" within the coverage of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, it could not very well be held to be a "foreign country"
within the exclusionary provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The instant case presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to reverse
the questionable decision by a closely divided court which it had handed down in
the Vermilya-Brown. case. The expression "any territory and possession of the United
States" used in the Fair Labor Standards Act, given its natural and normally understood meaning, seems clearly to refer to places over which the United States exercises sovereignty 20 All the circumstances attending the leasing of the bases accorded with the express opinion of the State Department that sovereignty over the
leased areas was never transferred from Great Britain to the United States. It seems
rather far fetched to ascribe to Congress, when it enacted the Fair Labor Standards
Act in 1938, an intention to extend its coverage to areas, subsequently acquired during the late hostilities, over which the United States never claimed sovereignty.
Extension of coverage, if Congress so desired, should have been left to the legislative branch of the government. Congress may extend to the leased bases the
provisions of any statute by amendment as it did in the case of the Longshoreman's
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act. - '
It does seem anomalous, as Justice Jackson observed in his concurring opinion
in the principal case,m that a workman at a leased air base may maintain an action
for overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act--not, however, under the
Eight Hour Law-and yet, if he is injured, may not recover damages against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Inasmuch as the leases on the
bases have some ninety years to run, stability and constancy would seem to dictate
a Congressional reversal of the majority opinion in the Vcrmilya-Brtmt case.
The decision in the principal case seems to be clearly sound. It deserves comment
solely because it again points up the error committed in the Vermilya-Brotm decision.
17.
18.
28 U.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See note 5 supra.
60 STAT. 845 (1946), 28 U. S. C. § 943 (Supp. 1948); New Title: 63 STAT. 444,
S. C. § 2680 (Supp. 1949).
171 F. 2d 208 (2d Cir. 1948).
338 U. S.217, 219 (1949).
55 STAT. 622 (1941), 42 U. S. C. § 1651 (1946).
338 U. S. 217, 224 (1949).

Only Justice Jackson seems to doubt the validity of

the decision in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell in the face of the holding in the instant
case. Id. at 225. Justice Frankfurter concurs with the construction placed on the Federal
Tort Claims Act for the reasons which supported his dis-sent in the Vermilya-Brown case.
Id. at 224.
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WiLLs-DEsCENT AND DISTRIBUTIoN-APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 18 AND 26 or
THE DECEDENT ESTATE LAW WHERE THIRD PARTIES ARE NAMED BENEFICIARIES

UNDER WILL.-Testator willed one-half of his property to his widow and the remaining half to collateral relati~es. An unprovided for child born after the making of
the will and not mentioned in the will exercised his right under Section 26 of the
Decedent Estate Law to take an intestate share of his deceased parent's estate.
Thereupon the widow, foreseeing that she would get less than the statutory minimum
provided her by Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law (since the child's two-third
share would be made up by taking two-thirds from the share of each beneficiary
under the will), elected to take her one-third intestate share. In reconciling the
conflict occasioned by the application of Sections 18 and 26, the Surrogate held
that the estate should be distributed 1/3 to the widow, 8/15 to the child, and
2/15 in equal shares among the collaterals on the ground that both the shares of the
after-born child and the collaterals are subject to the widow's right of election.
Matter of Vicedomini, 195 Misc. 1057, 91 N. Y. S. 2d 472 (Surr. Ct. 1949).
The issue presented in the principal case was previously considered in Matter of
Wurmnbrand.1 On substantially similar facts that court distributed the estate by
awarding one-third to the surviving spouse under his right of election and two-thirds
to the after-born child under Section 26. Though the holding in the Wurmbrand case
gave a literal interpretation to Sections 18 and 26, it resulted in the complete exclusion of all collateral relatives and other devisees and legatees named in the will.
Despite this apparent precedent, the court in the instant case held that a distribution which awarded the after-born child less than his intestate share (two-thirds)
was not in conflict with the Wurmbrand case. It said of that case: "The parties
did not put in issue before the Surrogate the question as to whether or not the
after-born child should contribute proportionately to make up the deficit occasioned
by operation of section 26."2 While it is true that the Surrogate in the Wilrmbrand
case did not expressly decide that the after-born child did not have to contribute
to make up the widow's deficit, such principle of law is implicit and essential to the
result achieved by the court in that case.3 It would seem, therefore, that the instant
case is inconsistent with and opposed to the views implied in the Surrogate's opinion
in the earlier case.
Upon analysis of the two cases it is apparent that their difference in result is due
primarily to a difference in approach. The earlier decision hewed closely to the
language of the Decedent Estate Law and completely disregarded the testamentary
intent of the testator; the instant case endeavored to give some expression to the
intention of the testator and yet comply with the relevant statutes. In both instances
the courts were trying to extricate themselves from the horns of a dilemma:'to give
1. 194 Misc. 203, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 705 (Surr. Ct. 1949), aff'd without opinion, 275 App.
Div. 915, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 686 (1949).
2. Matter of Vicedomini, 195 Misc. 1057, 1063, 91 N. Y. S. 2d 472, 477 (Surr. Ct. 1949).
3. This was not an issue "lurking in the record"; the suit was specifically brought by
the collaterals to establish a claim to a portion of the estate. The reasoning of the court
in the instant 'case, that the Wurmnbrand case did not establish the precedent that the
after-born child does not have to contribute to make up the widow's deficit, is applicable
only to the holding of the Appellate Division. For there only matters that were in issue
were decided. However, in the Surrogate's Court whether or not the child should contribute was decided, and the result indicates that the Surrogate did not think the child
should contribute.
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full effect to the testamentary intent is to violate the statute, while to apply literally
the statute would be to violate the command of the testator to dispose of his
property as he had willed. The problem is, therefore, to determine which of the
two results reached in the cases under discussion conforms with existing legal principles in the law of decedent estates.
Prompted by a motive to carry out the testator's expressed intent, the court
in the instant case proceeded to consider the problem in a manner which would
substantially comply with the statutes and yet give some force to the manifested
testamentary intent. The method used to accomplish this aim appears to be procedural more than substantive; i.e., the chronology in which the court distributed
the estate necessarily brought about the desired result. Section 26 was applied first,
the widow and the collaterals contributing to make up the after-born child's share.
The logic of this order of procedure commends itself, since before the exercise of
the child's right the widow's share was greater than the statutory limit allowable
under her right of election. At this point the child had two-thirds, the widow onesixth and the collaterals one-sixth. Next Section 18 was invoked to provide for the
widow her one-third of the estate. To make up the widow's deficit, one-sixth, the
child was forced to contribute pro rata with the collaterals since he was a beneficiary
4
and required to contribute with those of his class. The child's right was thereby
but
only in the sense that the child
of
election
right
to
the
widow's
subordinated
had to contribute to make up the widow's right of election. The court found support
for this result in the wording of Section 18 which provides that after the widow
has received her share the terms of the will shall as far as possible remain effective.
Thus the consideration that the collaterals should receive something after the
widow's share was 'provided seems to have some support.5
It would appear, however, that the court's reasoning in the instant case was not
unassailable in trying to sustain the result on a literal view of Sections 18 and 26.
Construing the sections strictly it is difficult to see in them any authority for giving
effect to the testator's intent, for both sections permit a violation of the manifest
intent of the testator. To attempt to reconcile the wording of the statutes with the
testator's testamentary intent would appear unwarranted. On this basis the decision
in the Wusrmbrand case was more logical since it did not recognize the manifest
intent of the testator.
It is submitted, however, that the decision in the instant case may be justified
on another ground; viz., the court was not limited to a literal interpretation of
the statute. Where there is ambiguity or incompatibility in a statute the solution
is to be found by looking for the intent of the framers of the statute, resolving
conflicts in favor of their intent. In discussing a problem on statutory construction
the Supreme Court of the United States said: "But in construing a statute we are
not always confined to a literal reading, and may consider its object and purpose,
4. In re Finkelstein's Estate, 189 Aisc. 180, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 596 (Surr. CL 1947).
5. That the clause "as far as possible" should operate to give the collaterals a share
when Section 26 is applied as well as Section 18 would not appear to be justified by this
phrase in Section 18 alone. It is more reasonable to conclude that the clause was inserted
so that the operation of Section 18 would not work a revocation of the entire will. The
same may be said for Section 26; the exercise of the right does not work a complete
revocation of the will as does happen under the analogous statutes in Delaware, and in
certain instances in Ohio and Kansas. See DiL. Rnv. CODE § 3251 (1935), Ormo Gm.. CoDn
Axm. § 10504-49 (1926), KAM. GEN.STAT. A.". § 22240 (1935).
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the things with which it is dealing, and the condition of affairs which led to its
enactment so as to effectuate rather than destroy the spirit and force of the law
which the legislators intended to enact." 6
The purpose of the legislators in enacting Section 18 was to provide a surviving
1
spouse with an irreducible minimum of one-third of the deceased spouse's estate.
So the court in the instant case did not violate the spirit nor the literal meaning
of this section.
It remains, then, to determine the object and purpose of the legislators in creating
8
Section 26. At common law there was no limit on the right to disinherit. Section 26
was enacted primarily to prevent disinheritance in certain circumstances; namely,
where the disinheritance was deemed unintentional.0 The rationale of the statute
seems to be that there is a presumption that the parent would want to perform his
duty to provide for the child. In this regard similar statutes which are extant
in almost all American jurisdictions' 0 prescind from the civil law which considered
the silent will as a violation of social duty only and did not operate on any theory
of presumed intent."
6. American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 293 (1907). See Foley Bros.,
Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U. S. 281 (1948) where the court discusses canons of construction.
7. THE REPORTS OF THE DECEDENT EsTATE COmnSSION AND THE NEW LEOSLATION 86
(1930).
8. Davids in speaking of the origin of Section 26 has said: "This provision of statute
was derived from a rule of the civil law, which, upon the subsequent birth of a child,
unnoticed in the will, worked a nullification of the instrument. At common law the birth
of a child subsequently to execution did not affect the disposition of the parent's estate;
and the purpose of the enactment was to adopt the civil law principle." 1 DAviD9, NEW
YORK LAW OF WILLS § 547.

9. In Brush v. Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 506 (N. Y. 1820), there was a marriage and the
birth of a child after the making of testator's will. The court held that both elements
worked such a change in testator's circumstances that the will was deemed entirely
revoked. (This was the common law revocation by circumstances.) The court states that

the subsequent birth alone would not have affected the testator's will: "It is the policy
of the English law, to give to every man of competent will and understanding, the absolute control (however imprudently or improvidently he may at times exercise It) over
the disposition of his estate; and the children are not considered as having a legal interest
or property in the effects of the father. . . . Every person is permitted to make his own
will, at his discretion; and he may even disinherit his children, if he should be so inclined,
whether they deserved, or not, such extreme chastisement." Id. at 518. After this case,
in the 1827-1828 meeting of the legislature, the statute on the after-born child was
enacted. 2 N. Y. REV. STAT. ch. 6, t. 1, art. 3, § 49 (1827-1828).

It only provided, how-

ever, that the after-born child could take an intestate share of the estate of his father.
In 1869 the statute was amended to its present form making the child's right applicable
to the estates of both parents. N. Y. Laws of 1869, ch. 22, § 1. As to marriage after the
making of a will made before Sept. 1, 1930, Section 35 of the Decedent Estate Law now
provides that such will is entirely revoked as to the surviving spouse unless provision
has been made by an ante-nuptial agreement in writing. In re Van Hoecke's Will, 93
N. Y. S. 2d 19 (Surr. Ct. 1949).

10. Mathews in his analysis of American statutes states that only Florida, Maryland
and Wyoming do not have provisions for an after-born child. Mathews, Pretermifled
Heirs, 29 COL. L. REv,. 748, 749 (1929).
11. Id. at 748.
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Considering Sections 18 and 26 in this historical light, we find then that Section 18
gives a substantive right to a definite amount,'-' whereas Section 26 only intends
to provide for the child as the law deems the parent would so desire. In this sense
Section 26 becomes a provision of the testator's will; i.e., in that it is a crystallization of the presumed intent of the testator.13 In accord with such a view the problem
is not one of chronology,' 4 for the statutory minimum of the widow would necessarily be excluded from the computation whether Section 18 or Section 26 was
applied first. The problem is in reality whether the child's share should be taken
pro rata from the beneficiaries under the will, giving the child a proportion of his
intestate share; or whether thelentire shares of the beneficiaries should be given
to the child, the child taking a full intestate share.
It is difficult to see a compelling necessity to give the child a full intestate share
when the parent could have satisfied Section 26 by willing the child a lesser amount,
or even by merely mentioning that the after-born child was to get nothing.15 Yet
Section 26, like Section 18, provides that the child should take an intestate share.
With such vast differences in the natures of the rights under Sections 18 and 26 it
would appear that some distinction should be made in their application. 10
It is submitted that on the facts in the instant case a strict interpretation of
"intestate share", which would not permit the unprovided for infant's share to be
cut down, is unreasonable and unwarranted. In accord with the spirit of Section 26
the after-born child should be deemed to benefit under the will in an amount equal
to an intestate share 17 but said share might be invaded under a spouse's right of
election. This would appear sound, since it is the will which actually gives the
child his right; i.e., in that the presumed intent of the testator to provide for the
child is made part of the will. In this manner the after-born child would be in a
class with the collaterals and forced to contribute along with them.
12. In re Van Hoecke's Will, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 19, 22 (Surr. CL 1949).
13. The Supreme Court of Texas in this manner construed a similar statute protecting
the after-born child as ingrafted upon the will as an unwritten part thereof. Conroy v.
Conroy, 130 Tex. 508, 110 S. W. 2d 568 (1937).

14. See 63 HARv. L. Rav. 703, 705 (1950), where the instant case is criticized because
of the reliance on "mere chronology".
15. Mere "mention" of the possibility of an after-born child avoids the child's righL
In re Kraston's Will, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 364 (Surr. Ct. 1945). It should be noted that Section 26 also applies to children adopted after the making of a will, In re Griffin's Will,
159 Misc. 12, 287 N. Y. Supp. 514 (Surr. Ct. 1936), and to illegitimate children within

the limits of Section 89 of the Decedent Estate Law, Bunce v. Bunce, 14 N. Y. Supp. 659
(1891).

16. The problem might be viewed more clearly if we substitute a second son in the
place of one of the collaterals. In this instance the son within the contemplation of his
parent-let us say because he was a faithful son-would get less than the unmentioned
son only because the after-born son was unmentioned. (It is well to keep in mind that
the after-born son might be a financially independent adult.) Such a result, however
incongruous it might seem, would follow if the meaning of "intestate share" in Section 18
was applied to Section 26.
17. It must be noted, however, that the child's right is not dependent upon the will.
In Smith v. Robertson, 89 N. Y. 555 (1882), where the executor sold realty as directed
by the will, the after-born child was not confined to a pursuit of the proceeds of the sale
but had an action in ejectment against the innocent grantee.
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Furthermore, the right provided the after-born child should, in the wording of
Section 26, be satisfied by a proportionate contribution.' 8 Since no proportion of
the shares held by the collaterals could yield a full intestate share to the child, the
court would be exceeding the authority given in the statute if it applied the complete
shares of the collaterals to make up the child's intestate share. So to do would
work a total revocation of the testator's will and would be adverse to the spirit of
the statute. On the other hand, it would appear that the result reached in the
instant case is fairly within the terms of the statute and in complete conformity
with the object and purpose of the statute. In 1869 the revisor of Section 26 stated
its purpose as follows: "Whether the birth of a child after marriage is a revocation
seems yet a matter of doubt. .

.

. Some legislative declaration seems expedient, and,

while the consequences of an entire revocation are avoided by the above section, a
just provision seems to be made for a probable oversight on the condition that the
child is not mentioned or referred to in the will."'u
When Section 18 was enacted in 1930 a substantial change was effected in our
Decedent Estate Law. In large measure the problem in the instant case was occasioned by the failure of the legislators at this time expressly to qualify Section 26
as influenced by Section 18. The right of the after-born child is of no greater
moment than the right given to a beneficiary to take property under a will. Both are
statutory rights, both were in existence at the time of the enactment of Section 18,
and both must be deemed affected by, and subordinated to, Section 18. At no time
before the enactment of Section 18 could a situation have arisen under the application of Section 26, where the beneficiaries would suffer a complete loss of their
testamentary gifts. Section 26 only contracted the rights of beneficiaries by requiring them to contribute to the after-born child. In turn, Section 18 was only
another contraction of the rights of those entitled to a share in the decedent's
estate, and since both the after-born child and those named in the will are in a broad
sense "the beneficiaries", the rights of both should be deemed curtailed by Section 18.
It is submitted, however, that some legislative pronouncement is necessary to
correct the discrepancy caused by the difference in results in the Wtirrbrand case
and in the principal case. A satisfactory solution, in full accord with the object of
Section 26 could be obtained by amending Section 26 so that the after-born child
would be entitled to a "just provision" to be determined by the court from the
facts in each case.20
18. The relevant portion of Section 26 reads as follows: "...
every such child [shall
succeed to an intestate share] . . . and shall be entitled to recover the same portion from
the devisees and legatees, in proportion and out of the parts devised and bequeathed to
them by such will." See also Matter of Goldsmith, 175 Misc. 757, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 419
(Surr. Ct. 1940), where pro rata contribution is discussed.
19. Revisor's note quoted in Tavshanjian v. Abbott, 130 App. Div. 863, 865, 115 N. Y.
Supp. 938, 940 (1st Dep't 1909).
20. In addition to solving the problem in the instant case this recommended change
would do away with the hardship worked on a son named a beneficiary in the will. See
note 17 supra.

